Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson by Darren Staloff

Author:Darren Staloff
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Farrar, Straus and Giroux
Published: 2011-09-26T00:00:00+00:00

The Crisis Defused: John Adams and the Treaty of Mortefontaine

In the months following the disclosure of the XYZ Affair, hostilities with France intensified. As the public exploded in paroxysms of patriotic rage, many High Federalists pressured Adams for a formal declaration of war, an act that would devastate their Francophile Republican opposition and almost assure the victory of the president and his party in the next election. At first appearance, Adams seemed eager to comply. In June he had informed Congress that he would “never send another minister to France” unless given prior “assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation.” Six months later Adams remained every bit as bellicose. The Directory’s refusal to rescind its orders of the previous January targeting American shipping convinced him that only “an efficient preparation for war” could possibly “ensure peace.” With the solid support of his party and an opposition in retreat, Adams seemed poised to lead his country into its first large-scale war since its founding. The Federalist ship dominated the political seas, and a truculent President Adams was securely at the helm.163

Then without warning, John Adams transformed the political landscape. On February 18, 1799, he nominated William Vans Murray as “envoy Extraordinary” to the French Directory. Adams took this dramatic measure entirely on his own initiative, without even consulting his own cabinet. The political impact was enormous. Republicans were rejuvenated and Federalists divided. The moderate wing of his party embraced Adams’s initiative. Attorney General Charles Lee and Navy Secretary Benjamin Stoddert congratulated the president on his statesmanship, and John Marshall praised his “wisdom and courage.” High Federalists, however, were apoplectic. Less than one month earlier Hamilton—now their undisputed leader—had urged a formal declaration of war. They now saw Adams’s abrupt nomination of Murray as both pusillanimous and politically suicidal. A delegation of five High Federalist senators, led by Theodore Sedgwick, called on Adams, threatening to block the nomination. Adams was adamant. If Murray’s nomination was blocked, he threatened to resign the presidency to Thomas Jefferson. He did, nonetheless, agree to add two additional envoys to join Murray. Two days later, on February 25, he nominated Oliver Ellsworth and Patrick Henry—the latter replaced, when he declined, by Federalist governor William Davie of North Carolina—to join Murray as members of a fresh peace commission, a nomination that was shortly ratified.164

At first glance, Adams’s abrupt about-face seems impulsive, if not foolhardy. His heroic defiance of the previous year sounded hollow as he proposed to sue for peace once again after promising to never do so without prior assurances from Talleyrand, assurances that had not been officially received as yet. Feeling betrayed, High Federalists lashed out, rejecting Adams’s leadership of the party and actively opposing his measures. Yet on closer inspection, Adams’s change of mind seems far less precipitous. He had always favored a diplomatic solution to the Quasi-War. In fact, he had broached the idea of a fresh embassy to Secretary of State Pickering in late October 1798 and the rest of the cabinet the following month.

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